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 Much has been written about the challenges posed by the Chinese adoption of what the U�S� military calls “A2/AD” (antiaccess/area-denial) in the 
western Pacific� Accordingly, the Pacific remains a key focus area for the U�S� 
Navy and Air Force, and more recently the Army, with the Navy promising to 
put 60 percent of its forces in that theater as part of the “Pacific pivot�” Yet as 
focus remains on the Pacific, the rest of the world is not standing still� This is 
exemplified in the eastern Mediterranean, where the Russians have begun laying 
the seeds to create an A2/AD zone in the region against the United States and its 
allies� If fully realized, an A2/AD envelope would put Western access to the Suez 
Canal, the Black Sea, and the resource-rich eastern Mediterranean at the mercy 
of an increasingly aggressive Russian regime�
LAYING THE SEEDS
Three interrelated elements make the development of an A2/AD zone in the 
eastern Mediterranean possible for the Russians� The first of these is the pros-
pect of a credible, present military force, which in this case would most likely 
be provided by forward deployments from the Russian Black Sea Fleet� Armed 
with three (six by later this year) new, enhanced Kilo-class diesel-electric sub-
marines, eleven thousand marines, and a surface 
contingent of forty-two ships as of 2014, the Rus-
sian Black Sea Fleet is certainly one of the most 
capable maritime forces in the region�1 In con-
trast, the U�S� Sixth Fleet has a single command 
ship and four destroyers (DDGs) permanently 
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RUSSIAN A2/AD IN THE EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN
assigned to it as of 2015, and those DDGs are based at the other end of the Medi-
terranean, in Spain, with only occasional rotational presence from ships pass-
ing through its area of regard on the way to or back from the Middle East. 
Although the United States does have regional allies with credible maritime 
combat power, the Russians are working to drive wedges into these relationships 
—which, not coincidentally, is the second pillar of Russia’s regional strategy.
The Russian effort to decouple long-standing allies such as Greece, Turkey, 
and Egypt (and perhaps even Italy) from political and military alignment with the 
United States has been helped by U.S. policy choices as well as favorable circum-
stances the Russians can exploit.2 The case of Greece began with the formation 
of a coalition government, since reelected, comprised of far-left and right-wing 
parties that are deeply resentful of the European Union and its American allies.3 
This government is committed to breaking out of the fiscal austerity “straitjacket” 
imposed as terms for European Union loans, and is ideologically aligned with 
Russian “Eurasianist” geopolitical theory.4 This state of affairs has opened new 
opportunities for extending Russian influence, and the Russians have waded into 
this fray, supporting the Greek government politically, and publicly entertaining 
the possibility of assisting Greece with its debt issues.5 Greco-Russian relations 
have, not surprisingly, warmed considerably. 
In the case of Turkey, Russia has taken advantage of a decadelong trend by the 
Erdogan government away from democracy toward authoritarianism.6 As the 
West has criticized President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for imprisoning journalists, 
fabricating charges against political opponents, and repressing civil dissent, the 
Russians have remained supportive, to the point that Erdogan has praised Putin 
directly.7 This is not to say that areas of disagreement do not exist between these 
two nations, especially over policies with respect to Syria. Nevertheless, amid these 
disputes the Turks continue to promote a narrative of cooperation in other areas.8
The other Russian charm offensive in the region has been focused on Egypt. 
Faced with a virulent insurgency in the Sinai, and a U.S. administration that 
until recently was withholding military aid as punishment for the suspension of 
democracy, Egypt’s repressive military junta has instead turned toward the Rus-
sians for military equipment procurement for the first time since the mid–Cold 
War.9 The result of these actions has been increased goodwill for Russia from 
three countries that control choke-point access to and freedom of maneuver 
within the eastern Mediterranean, not to mention use of the eastern Mediter-
ranean to access the Black and Red Seas. Neutrality (or even a delay, if the crisis 
were fast developing) in contributing formal support to the United States by these 
countries could pose a major challenge to U.S. strategy in the event of a Russian-
American crisis or conflict.
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With access for Russia’s credible maritime combat power vastly improved, the 
final aspect of Russian regional strategy is to secure and expand basing agree-
ments� Limited by geography, the Russians have no port on the Mediterranean; 
any warships they might want to put in the region would likely come via the Black 
Sea (although assets could be deployed from their other fleets, assuming they 
could pass through Gibraltar or Suez)� Even though Turkey may be more cordial 
with Russia now than in the past, forward-basing agreements hedge against a risk 
of change in the political winds in Ankara that could bottle up the Black Sea Fleet� 
Additionally, forward basing allows a navy to keep more assets in theater without 
increasing fleet size, multiplying the impact of a smaller force� 
The Russians’ approach to expanding regional forward basing is simple: start 
with what already exists, then grow selectively, as permitted by relationships and 
favorable geography� Today, Russia’s only naval base outside the former Soviet 
Union is in Tartus, Syria, on the shore of the eastern Mediterranean� As the ad-
vance of anti-Assad rebels has increasingly pressured the Syrian regime, Russia 
has doubled down on both political and military support to the regime� Politi-
cally, Russia has provided a friendly voice at the United Nations to the otherwise-
pariah Assad government, and has worked within the United Nations and other 
international forums to blunt policies that could harm Assad�10 Militarily, Russia 
has since September of 2015 begun to commit regular military forces in support 
of the Syrian government, including ground-attack fixed- and rotary-wing air-
craft, naval vessels, and Russian marine infantry�11 However the Syrian civil war 
might turn out, it is clear that Russia is willing to invest to preserve its regional 
allies (and bases)� Lastly, the Cypriots, long prone to Russian sympathies, recently 
agreed to an expansion of Russian port calls, and even potentially an air base�12 
This could provide the Russians an additional strategic location to use in the 
region beyond Syria� 
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE ENVELOPE
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the presence of Yakhont antiship 
cruise missiles (ASCMs) in Syria alone has been enough to create a surface naval 
A2/AD zone in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean�13 Furthermore, 
rolling the three previously discussed aspects of Russian strategy together, it be-
comes clear how an expanded eastern Mediterranean A2/AD envelope could be 
established in the very near future� As Mahan famously wrote, the land features 
of a region can play a large role in determining maritime influence and access�14 
As part of its intervention in support of the Syrian government, Russia has es-
tablished a new air base in western Syria, giving it a second operating location 
in Syria beyond its naval station at Tartus�15 Russia has already deployed tacti-
cal aircraft and strategic airlift to its new air base, putting in place a key pillar 
NWC_Winter2016Review.indb   74 12/3/15   11:47 AM
3
Altman: Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterranean A Growing Risk
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 A LT M A N  7 5
for any future establishment of an A2/AD envelope� In such a scenario, tactical 
aircraft would function as one part of the system, performing air interdiction, 
land attack, and potentially antiship attack of U�S� or NATO forces attempting 
to operate within the A2/AD zone� The preexisting deployment of land-based, 
Russian-supplied Yakhont ASCMs in Syria provides an additional boon to the 
area-denial aspect of Russia’s approach, which could be augmented by further 
sales or deployments of Russian forces equipped with ASCMs to other friendly 
countries�16 Additionally, Russia has deployed a number of unmanned aircraft to 
provide targeting information to its forces in Syria; many of these systems could 
be extendable to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations 
within Syria’s periphery�17 Competent ISR is a major pillar of effective A2/AD 
operations, as these systems are essential for cueing attacks by other forces such 
as aircraft, ships, or land-based missile batteries against over-the-horizon (OTH) 
targets� Information gathered by these systems can be meshed with that from 
overhead imagery (which does not need a forward operating base) to increase 
overall targeting effectiveness� 
While the Russians have deployed many of the asset types needed for effec-
tive A2/AD in the eastern Mediterranean, they have not yet deployed other key 
A2/AD capabilities� One example is the failure to deploy advanced mobile long-
range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) alongside existing Russian Yakhonts, tacti-
cal aircraft, and ISR assets in Syria, or perhaps to deploy such SAMs in notional 
locations in Cyprus� Much has been written about the capabilities of Russian 
“triple digit” SAMs, both the in-service S-300s and S-400s as well as the develop-
mental S-500� S-500s will have up to a 600 km antiair range, according to some 
Russian sources—enough to blanket the region from Crete east, assuming they 
are based in Cyprus (the same sources cite the S-400’s range as 400 km, with 
newer variants of the earlier S-300 at a more modest 200 km)�18 The Russians 
may also seek to adapt these systems to enable integration aboard surface ships 
beyond the existing S-300FM integration in Russian cruisers, further increasing 
SAM deployment flexibility�19 Advanced SAMs such as these would significantly 
improve Russian A2/AD capability in the region by enabling wide-area and 
highly responsive antiair coverage while simultaneously decreasing the demands 
on Russian fighters to maintain combat air patrols� 
To increase further the effectiveness of their targeting, the Russians could also 
consider deploying land-based OTH targeting (OTHT) assets in the region, most 
likely at one of their Syrian bases for those systems that require a fixed location� 
Examples of such OTHT systems could include signals intelligence collection 
sites and OTH surface-wave radars, both of which would increase Russian situ-
ational awareness� OTHT would moreover, by definition, increase Russian detec-
tion ranges, and could be interlinked with other ISR assets to form an integrated, 
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highly capable detection system� A Russian deployment of Black Sea–based 
Kilo-class submarines to the region would insert a further threat into the under-
sea domain at a time when more advanced but already overtasked U�S� nuclear 
submarines continue to decline within the force structure�20 If Russia could rely 
on Iranian irregular troops or proxies such as Hezbollah to provide material 
support for the imposition of an A2/AD zone—for instance, by assisting with lo-
cal ground defense and security in areas where such systems are deployed—the 
strength of the zone would be amplified� The degree to which U�S� and allied 
(especially Israeli, given the country’s proximity) surface and air access in the 
eastern Mediterranean would be imperiled by any single one of the potential 
deployments discussed, and especially by combinations of them, should be clear� 
Taking into account the technological and tactical considerations of the previ-
ous paragraphs, what else would the Russians need to do to establish formally an 
effective, militarily relevant A2/AD zone in the eastern Mediterranean? The first 
and most important action would be to attempt to ensure Turkish noninterfer-
ence (Greek and Egyptian noninterference would be desirable too, but much less 
important comparatively)� As touched on already, since Turkey controls access 
from Russian Black Sea ports to the eastern Mediterranean, Turkish noninterfer-
ence greatly simplifies the imposition of an A2/AD envelope� So long as Turkey 
allows Russian vessels to pass into the Mediterranean, resupply of forward Rus-
sian forces would be uncomplicated; reinforcements could flow in unabated as 
needed� To support this outcome, Russia might use its newly deployed forces in 
Syria plus its preexisting forces in the Black Sea and south Caucasus regions, or 
perhaps the threat of closer Russian political cooperation with Greece, to coerce 
Turkish passivity in the event of a Russian threat against other NATO allies� 
While Russian establishment of an eastern Mediterranean A2/AD zone could 
still work even if a neutral Turkey closed passages from the Black Sea to the Medi-
terranean during or surrounding a conflict, an openly hostile Turkey would almost 
certainly negate Russian plans�21 In that eventuality, any Russian forces in theater 
would be subject to a rear-column threat from a capable Turkish navy (along 
with land-based aircraft), and Russian bases would be threatened by Turkish 
offensive capabilities� Accordingly, for a Russian eastern Mediterranean A2/AD 
envelope to be feasible, at the very least Turkey must not actively oppose it with 
military force� 
In the event a neutral Turkey did seal access to the Mediterranean, one work-
around could be the use of an air bridge to resupply forward forces by ferrying 
supplies from Russia through Iran and Iraq into the region� Russia has already 
pursued this approach to deploy its forces in Syria when American allies did 
not permit Russian overflight of their territory�22 However, less matériel can be 
supplied via air than by sea, and the resultant volume might not be adequate to 
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maintain sufficient forces in theater over a longer period of tension or conflict� 
In such a case, Russia could also attempt to move matériel overland along the 
same route as the air bridge, although it is unclear whether the transportation 
infrastructure exists to support such logistical volume� Nor is it clear whether 
Iraq would grant such access� 
Beyond securing Turkish nonhostility, the next action needed to increase the 
chance of success in this endeavor is the prepositioning of forces and supplies in 
the region—which the Russians seem to be doing in Syria today, and may con-
sider in the future elsewhere, such as in Cyprus� There are many ways this could 
be accomplished in countries such as Cyprus, where the Russians lack a perma-
nent base, whether through announced “rotational” basing agreements or simply 
secretly stockpiling hardware with tacit Cypriot acceptance (perhaps in exchange 
for a favor, such as a generous loan or a discount on Russian oil)� However it 
is accomplished, having sufficient combat power and supplies in theater when 
a conflict starts would confer significant advantage on Russian forces by both 
eliminating the time needed to concentrate combat power and providing forward 
forces with several days, if not weeks, of warfighting supplies, regardless of other 
operational considerations (for instance, if Turkey closed the straits to nations 
involved in the dispute while remaining neutral)� The Russians could augment 
combat power further, assuming they knew when the conflict would start (not 
an unreasonable suspicion, given recent events in Ukraine), by staging a training 
exercise to concentrate additional forces in the area before the conflict began, as 
they did against Georgia in 2008�23 Using an approach like this, the Russians may 
be able to present the establishment of an effective A2/AD zone as a fait accompli 
by the time a recognized conflict has emerged� 
If the Russians wanted to delay further a potential response in a crisis scenario, 
they could couple their establishment of an A2/AD zone with limited strikes on 
select hostile forces in theater (perhaps after some nominal period during which 
any forces would be allowed to flee—ideally designed to be too short to allow all 
hostile assets to leave) to solidify their credibility and force any opponents to fight 
their way into the A2/AD zone with forces brought in from other theaters� While 
this approach would be very likely to ensure a response from the nations whose 
assets were attacked, and would necessitate openly admitting their involvement 
(in contrast to their recent Ukraine interventions), the Russians may be willing to 
gamble that the delays and confusion caused by these strikes (especially if com-
bined with their recent diplomatic charm offensive in the region) would ultimate-
ly undermine the political will of some NATO, or other potentially NATO-allied, 
nations to respond� The goal of such an attack would be to raise the level of com-
mitment needed to respond and to dissuade other nations, especially those whose 
forces were not attacked (and who therefore might not yet be militarily involved), 
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from joining the effort. The more this line of thinking permeates among potential 
responding nations, the less potent a response the Russians would likely receive. 
Nevertheless, limited opening strikes like these are more of a consideration than 
an outright requirement for success.
PUTTING THE SCHEME TO WORK 
Assuming the Russians have at least some capability to establish an A2/AD zone 
in the eastern Mediterranean, it provides numerous geopolitical advantages. 
From a peacetime perspective, once local actors believe the Russians have a 
capability to establish an A2/AD zone at will, Russian influence in the region 
will increase further. While not all nations in the eastern Mediterranean are 
ideologically aligned with the Russian worldview, they will need to acknowledge 
that such a Russian ability—to deny other nations’ forces entry into and freedom 
of maneuver within the region—makes cordial relations with Russia essential. 
Accordingly, analysts should expect neutral countries or even nominal oppo-
nents of Russian interests (such as Jordan, Israel, and Bulgaria) to refrain from 
criticizing Russian actions on the whole, and to take a more deferential approach 
to bilateral relations as this reality materializes. Nations already leaning toward 
the Russian orbit may not only highlight their ties with Russia more openly but 
seek to deepen them. Over time, this will turn Russian power in the region into a 
norm—at the expense of U.S. and Western European influence, much in the same 
way that U.S. commitment of resources and combat power kept parts of Europe 
(Italy and Greece are prime examples) from succumbing to Soviet influence fol-
lowing the Second World War. 
To take this argument further and expand its time horizon, the combination 
of eastern Mediterranean pressure and aggressive Russian political messaging 
and military posturing both in Central Europe and in the Baltics could play into 
a larger effort to erode NATO.24 Assuming that southern Europe remains NATO’s 
“weak flank,” a long-term campaign to keep southern European nations from 
supporting diplomatic or other efforts to counter Russia’s goals out of fear of Rus-
sian power or desire for Russian friendship would erode NATO’s credibility, if not 
also its combat effectiveness. This could feasibly be part of a longer-term plan to 
break the alliance, as the more NATO seems unable to maintain the internal co-
hesion necessary to confront challenges, the less credible it becomes. This incre-
mental approach fits with recent Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, 
whereby Russia slowly ratcheted up its aggression (combined with extensive mis-
information) to achieve a fait accompli before it could be effectively challenged.
If some sort of confrontation were to occur, the ability to establish, or even 
to threaten plausibly to establish, an eastern Mediterranean A2/AD zone could 
confer distinct warfighting advantages as well. Consider if the Russian aim in a 
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campaign were to reclaim some part of the Baltics� To slow NATO’s ability to re-
spond to such a provocation, the Russians could use their SAM capabilities to de-
clare a no-fly zone in the eastern Mediterranean, and declare military aircraft of 
any NATO or NATO-supporting nations to be legitimate targets� The most likely 
reaction to this threat by those nations close by would be to seek support imme-
diately from NATO, which would distract from a response elsewhere� The mere 
confusion caused by such a move could delay NATO action long enough to allow 
the Russians to create a fait accompli in the Baltics� Once they are entrenched, the 
prospect of forcibly evicting Russian forces from the Baltics becomes much more 
daunting, and many NATO nations would likely not have the domestic political 
support necessary for a potentially large campaign� 
Of course, the “second front” approach described here could also be used in 
ways less focused on warfighting, such as to break the resolve of regional NATO 
nations to continue resisting Russian policies� As an example, Russia could es-
tablish an air-defense identification or maritime exclusion zone in the region 
and claim that such an action was needed to “prevent the delivery of weapons to 
terrorists threatening the Syrian people�” In the case of an air-defense identifica-
tion zone, any aircraft could be denied this airspace if its leadership were work-
ing against Russian aims (by supporting sanctions, opposing the Assad govern-
ment, etc�), and diverting aircraft around it consistently could be expensive and 
time-consuming� The Russians could similarly take this campaign to the seas by 
insisting that any vessel with a NATO flag passing through the area be subject 
to additional searches� These searches could be imposed concurrently with the 
“preventative” no-fly zone described above for added effect� For those NATO na-
tions that seemingly are removed from the threat of Russian confrontation except 
with respect to a NATO Article 5 breach, it could become tempting to relieve 
themselves of these headaches by acceding to Russian influence�
COUNTERING RUSSIAN PLANS
Fortunately, there are options available to mitigate the risks of such an outcome� 
Starting at the geopolitical level, the most straightforward counter to the Russian 
establishment of an eastern Mediterranean A2/AD zone would be to break the 
nascent bond between Russia and Turkey�25 For reasons already described, an 
openly hostile Turkey would prove a fatal bar to Russian aspirations� Practically 
speaking, there are a number of pressure points that could be leveraged by Amer-
ican policy makers seeking to fracture the Russian-Turkish relationship� Perhaps 
most immediately, the conflict in Syria provides an opening� While the Russians 
continue to support the Assad government against all rebel forces, including 
through active aerial bombardment, Turkey remains fundamentally opposed to 
Assad’s continued presence and provides support to some of those same forces 
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seeking to overthrow him�26 This discord could be highlighted to increase domes-
tic pressure on President Erdogan to back off from supporting Russia� American 
officials could also consider more robustly supporting some Turkish-backed 
Syrian rebel groups to gain a more favorable perception from Erdogan� There are 
additional avenues that could be pursued to undermine Russian-Turkish bilateral 
relations as well, such as publicizing past historical enmity or Russia’s harsh treat-
ment of Muslims in its Caucasus region� 
Another nonmilitary option for countering Russian plans can be found in 
defense policy� Specifically, NATO nations could individually, in groups, or pref-
erably as one voice issue a strong statement of maritime declaratory policy with 
respect to Russian expansionism in the eastern Mediterranean� Such a statement 
would aim to show the Russians that the alliance is united in opposition to the 
Russian threat and that Russian moves are not going unnoticed� Of course, to be 
effective—to avoid being seen as hollow—this statement would need to be sup-
ported by military demonstrations� One such example could be the announce-
ment and visible media coverage of a NATO-wide war game in the Mediterra-
nean in which the alliance would practice its abilities to cooperatively respond 
to regional A2/AD challenges� The effect of this war game would be amplified if 
NATO forces were seen to be often practicing, as part of their normal routines, the 
planning and joint naval exercises needed to operate in an A2/AD environment�
Beyond geopolitical and defense-policy solutions, there are three broad, 
Navy-focused options that could be pursued� The first but least desirable of these 
would be transferring forces from other theaters to increase U�S� Navy (and by 
consequence NATO) capability in the eastern Mediterranean� The issues in the 
eastern Mediterranean are fundamentally a symptom of a U�S� Navy that is un-
dersized for the global tasks assigned to it and a NATO maritime force that no 
longer provides sufficient deterrent effect� To redeploy existing U�S� forces to the 
Mediterranean would merely exacerbate these symptoms in another part of the 
world� A second option—which from a navalist’s perspective is the most desir-
able, but simultaneously the most politically challenging—is to grow the size of 
the U�S� Navy� During the Cold War, carrier and amphibious group deployments 
to the eastern Mediterranean were routine, assuring U�S� allies of our commit-
ment to their defense while deterring potential Soviet aggression� By contrast, the 
Navy’s current supply of day-to-day deterrence through credible combat power 
and presence is far outstripped by worldwide demand� 
Acknowledging this issue, and taking the current fiscal-policy conflict be-
tween Congress and the administration into account, expanding the credibility 
and relevance of regional NATO forces may be the quickest and most feasible 
way to push back against the Russian A2/AD threat� There are two reinforcing 
actions that could be taken in this area, starting with reinvigorating Standing 
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NATO Maritime Groups� Currently NATO operates two Standing Maritime 
Groups, although between them both only seven ships are combatants (and three 
of those are recent augmentations above normal force structure)�27 Given that 
no allied submarines and only a handful of helicopters are included within the 
groups combined, this force is highly vulnerable to Russian submarine attack or 
coercion� This could be addressed by augmenting the standing group assigned 
to the Mediterranean with allied undersea forces� Furthermore, the allocation 
of dedicated land-based airpower and additional surface combatants to NATO 
maritime forces would increase their credibility in the region� To be maximally 
effective, these reinvigorated standing groups should ensure their proficiency 
in key training and warfare areas critical to defeating A2/AD networks� This 
should include fielding advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and train-
ing personnel to employ countersurveillance techniques that can together defeat 
any OTHT systems supporting Syria-based Yakhonts or potentially other ASCM 
threats� Other areas of emphasis could include increased focus on antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) techniques and amphibious raid support (to deal with potential 
inland Russian SAM threats)� Additionally, standing groups have the deterrent 
benefit of tying nations together, as an attack on the group would affect at least 
a half-dozen different countries� To add further effect, NATO leadership should 
work to ensure Greek and Turkish participation (although perhaps not concur-
rently, for historical reasons) in a Mediterranean Standing Maritime Group and 
cycle it through the eastern Mediterranean regularly, if not base it there�
The second action that would help to increase the credibility and relevance of 
regional NATO forces is to focus future acquisitions on capabilities that either 
fill current operational gaps or enable deployment of systems most likely to 
deter Russian aggression�28 Given previous coverage of Russian strengths in the 
region, one obvious area for technological improvement is ASW� Besides new 
Italian-variant European multipurpose frigates, or FREMMs, no other regional 
navy deploys ASW missiles or rockets (and even the FREMMs only have four 
per ship)�29 This oversight should be rectified in future surface-ship acquisitions, 
and an evaluation of the ability to backfit this capability onto current platforms 
should be undertaken� Similarly, a renewed commitment to ASW would be rein-
forced by consistently designing NATO and NATO allies’ surface ships intended 
to perform an ASW mission with a double hangar for ASW helicopters, which 
greatly increases their effectiveness over those with a single one�30 This is all the 
more critical given that, due to the aforementioned general lack of ASW missiles 
or rockets, most NATO navies can only attack enemy submarines organically 
through the use of a helicopter�
Another area where smarter procurements could fill an operational gap is 
EW� If NATO maritime forces are to operate credibly against the described 
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Russian A2/AD envelope, they will need to overcome potential threats from both 
land- and sea-based ASCMs� Having more sophisticated EW suites on board 
(preferably at or near the level of U�S� Navy capability) will make regional NATO 
maritime forces more survivable, and complicate holding them at risk� Prioritiz-
ing investments in unmanned systems (air, surface, and subsea) is another area 
to consider� Unmanned aerial systems, for instance, could help with a number 
of issues that current NATO maritime forces face, from improving communica-
tions resiliency in a denied environment (through line-of-sight linkages using 
unmanned aerial vehicles to pass data between platforms), to OTH targeting and 
sensing�31 Improved sensing would also be augmented by incorporating more 
unmanned undersea systems, which could help detect enemy submarines or 
perform reconnaissance of surface-denied areas� 
As a final consideration, doing more to integrate U�S� and NATO naval tacti-
cal data networks could pay large dividends from a warfighting perspective� This 
might include expanded testing efforts to ensure that developmental datalink 
management and naval combat system baselines across the alliance are interoper-
able and that defects are identified and corrected early� This might also include 
instituting more-efficient approaches to electronically “sanitizing” situational 
information originating from allies’ respective higher-classification resources to 
help facilitate a common force-level “picture�” This would allow ships of differ-
ent navies to pass tactical information back and forth easily, greatly improving 
each individual platform’s operating picture, and consequently the whole force’s 
as well� Closer integration of allies’ respective tactical data networks would also 
enable a more robust sensor picture that could be used for distributed fire control 
(i�e�, one platform fires weapons using sensor data provided by another platform) 
and more-efficient air defense (assuming a common set of rules of engagement 
could be agreed on and the requisite cooperative technical efforts were pursued)� 
However, given the information-assurance issues that could come with linking 
U�S� networks to those of another nation, the potential risks of such an approach 
and possible technical approaches to mitigating them should be well understood 
before pursuing this course�
Whatever course of action the United States and NATO ultimately pursue, it 
is important for policy makers and strategists alike to recognize the serious stra-
tegic implications of a Russian A2/AD envelope in the eastern Mediterranean� 
Such an envelope would present grave challenges to U�S� influence in the region 
and would imperil the free flow of commerce that is essential to U�S� and global 
prosperity� It would be wise to take steps now to prepare for this threat rather 
than attempting to address it after it becomes realized�
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